Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy

By : Abu Mohammad "Hamkar"

Stated U.S. policy is to ensure that Afghanistan will not again become a base for terrorist attacks
against the United States. Following policy reviews in 2009, the Obama Administration asserted
that it was pursuing a well-resourced and integrated military-civilian strategy intended to pave the
way for a gradual transition to Afghan leadership that will begin in July 2011 and be completed
by the end of 2014. To carry out U.S. policy, a total of 51,000 additional U.S. forces were
authorized by the two 2009 reviews, bringing U.S. troop numbers to a high of about 99,000, with
partner forces adding about 42,000. On June 22, 2011, President Obama announced that the
policy had accomplished most major U.S. goals and that a drawdown of 33,000 U.S. troops
would take place by September 2012. The first 10,000 of these are to be withdrawn by the end of
2011 in concert with the July 2011 start of a long-planned transition to Afghan security
leadership. That transition has begun in the first wave of areas, four cities and three full
provinces, and some U.S. troops have begun to come home. Amid widespread doubts that Afghan
governance and security institutions will be strong enough to protect themselves by the end of
2014, U.S. officials say that the U.S. intent is for a long-term relationship with Afghanistan that
will include U.S. military involvement long after then. The start of the transition coincides with a
senior personnel transition under way: top U.S. and NATO commander General Petraeus turned
over command to Lt. Gen. John Allen on July 18, and Ambassador Ryan Crocker replaced Karl
Eikenberry as U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan on July 25.
The death of Al Qaeda founder Osama bin Laden in a U.S. raid on May 1, 2011, has caused some
to argue that overarching U.S. goals will not be jeopardized by the drawdown. However, Al
Qaeda has had a minimal presence on the Afghanistan battlefield itself since 2001, and the
official U.S. military view is that security gains achieved against mostly Taliban and affiliated
Afghan insurgent groups in 2010 remain “fragile and reversible.” Many strategists, using lessons
learned from other U.S.-led campaigns, doubt that Afghanistan can be rendered permanently
stable unless Afghan militants are denied safe haven in Pakistan. Still, some believe a negotiated
settlement to the Afghanistan conflict has become more likely in the aftermath of bin Laden’s
death, and some preliminary talks with Taliban figures, led by the State Department, have begun.
There are major concerns among Afghanistan’s minorities and among its women that
reconciliation might produce compromises that erode the freedoms enjoyed since 2001.
Others believe that the crucial variable is the quality and extent of Afghan governance. In
particular, President Hamid Karzai’s failure to forcefully confront governmental corruption has
caused a loss of Afghan support for his government. However, the Administration view is that
governance is expanding and improving slowly. Still others believe that the key to long-term
stability is for Afghanistan’s neighbors to cease using Afghanistan to promote their own interests
and instead help Afghanistan reemerge as a major regional trade route. U.S. officials also hope to
draw on Afghanistan’s vast mineral resources to promote long term growth—several major
mining, agricultural, and even energy development programs, mostly funded by private
investment have begun in the past few years, with more in various stages of consideration.